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This article examines the effects of increasing market concentration level in the U.S. nitrogen 
fertilizer industry.  Results indicate that the costs of market power are greater than the benefits of 
market concentration, in terms of manufacturing cost efficiency.  To provide a stable nitrogen 
fertilizer supply at a relatively low price, it may be necessary to control natural gas price and/or 
reduce new import barriers from Middle East and former member states of the Soviet Union, 
where low cost gas is produced as a byproduct.   
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Market Power and Cost-Efficiency Effects of the Market Concentration 
In the U.S. Nitrogen Fertilizer Industry 
 
  In recent years, economists have increasingly confronted structural changes in the farm- 
input industry.  Increases in energy prices and labor costs, relative to both capital and materials 
prices, have induced shifts in both input use and its composition (Morrison) which have lead to 
structural changes in the farm-input industry, especially the fertilizer industry.  The market share 
by the four largest firms, C.F. Industries, Farmland Industries, PCS Nitrogen, Inc., and Terra 
Nitrogen, each of which has over 2 million tons of annual production capacity, has increased to 
more than 47 percent in 2000 from less than 21 percent in 1976.  An increase in market 
concentration through consolidation of plants often is associated with economies of plant size, but 
it may also create market power effects.      
In 2000 the U.S. nitrogen fertilizer industry utilized less than its full production capacity 
due to largely higher natural gas prices. An average of more than 4.3 million tons of anhydrous 
ammonia on average were imported during the 1996-2000 period, accounting for more than 19 
percent of the total U.S. consumption.  Imports of anhydrous ammonia are primarily from off-
shore production by multi-national companies (mainly the dominant firms in the U.S.) in Canada, 
which accounted for 41 percent of total imports, and in Trinidad-Tobago, which in 1997 accounted 
for 51 percent of total imports (Taylor).  This trend is expected to exacerbate if U.S. natural gas 
prices remain high compared to world prices.   
The domestic U.S. nitrogen fertilizer market has, however, been successfully protected 
from competition from Middle East and former member states of the Soviet Union, where low 
cost gas is produced as a byproduct, by the Ad Hoc committee of domestic U.S. nitrogen 
producers including Agrium, CF Industries, Coastal Chemicals, Mississippi Chemical, PCS 
Nitrogen, and Terra Industries (U.S. International Trade Commission, August 2000, December 
2000).  From January 1980 through December 1999 there were four anti-trust cases initiated   2 
addressing antidumping and countervailing duty issues.  As of April 30, 2001 there were nine 
cases of antidumping duty orders in effect, where multinational agribusiness firms such as 
ConAgra Inc. attempted to import urea from the former member states of the Soviet Union, 
including Belarus, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.  
Natural gas is the primary cost component in producing nitrogen fertilizers, approximately 
34 million British thermal units (MMBtu) of natural gas are needed for producing one ton of 
anhydrous ammonia.  Anhydrous ammonia (NH3), the primary source of nearly all nitrogen 
fertilizer used in the United States, is produced through a chemical reaction between nitrogen 
elements derived from air with hydrogen derived from natural gas. From the beginning of 2000, 
the average daily price for natural gas jumped from $2.37 per to an average in December 2000 of 
$8.80 and a contract price for January 2001 at a record high $9.90.  As a result, in 2001 the cost of 
producing nitrogen fertilizer rose to unprecedented levels, which in turn, forced nitrogen fertilizer 
producers to either idle plants or to significantly curtail their production rate to the industry's 
lowest level in history.  Accordingly, the effects on the supply of high prices of natural gas inputs, 
along with increased market concentration, have raised concerns about the potential impact on 
farmers and crop production.   
The objective of this study is to examine the market power effects and the cost-efficiency 
effects associated with the economies of size of an increasing market concentration level (Azzam) 
in the U.S. nitrogen fertilizer industry.   
 
Market Power Effects and Efficiency Effects 
Natural gas is the primary cost component in producing nitrogen fertilizers.  The energy 
content of natural gas is about 1.02 MMBtu per thousand cubic feet (Energy Information   3 
Administration, May 2001).  To address the economic effects of increased market concentration, 
let the profits to be maximized for the dominant nitrogen fertilizer firms, π d, be represented by: 
(1)   π d = [Py - 34PgI  (GI)]y - c(y, v),  
where  
Py = a unit price of nitrogen fertilizer ($/ton),  
GI = the total amount of natural gas for industrial use,  
PgI = a unit price of GI,  
y = the amount of nitrogen fertilizer production by the dominant firms,  
c = fertilizer production costs other than the costs to the firm for natural gas, and  
v = all other inputs necessary for nitrogen fertilizer production.    
The first order condition for profit-maximization is then represented by: 
(2) P y = [34PgI (￿￿02￿￿ ￿ ￿F￿\￿ Y￿￿￿\@ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 
where  
0  ￿￿3gI /￿*I)(GI /PgI) is the price flexibility of natural gas for industrial use,  
2  ￿￿*I /￿<￿￿<￿*I) is the nitrogen fertilizer transmission elasticity of natural gas for industrial use  
      where Y is an aggregate nitrogen fertilizer demand, 
￿  ￿￿<￿￿\￿￿\￿<￿ LV WKH WUDQVPLVVLRQ HODVWLFLW\ RI WKH 8￿6￿ QLWURJHQ IHUWLOL]HU LQGXVWU\￿ DQG  
￿  ￿￿3y/￿\￿￿\￿ 3y) is the price flexibility of nitrogen fertilizer for the dominant firms. 
Using equation (2), the marketing margin for nitrogen fertilizer producers is then 
represented by: 
(3)  M = Py - 34 PgI   
          = [34PgI ￿02￿ - ￿￿ @￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ >￿F￿\￿ Y￿￿￿\@ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿    4 
The first term in the bracket on the right-hand side from the equality in equation (3) represents the 
market power effects and the second represents the cost-efficiency effects for the nitrogen 
fertilizer industry.   
$VVXPLQJ WKDW WKH SURFHVVLQJ FRVW IXQFWLRQ LV D TXDGUDWLF VXFK WKDW F￿\￿Y￿   .1y - .2y
2, 
equation (3) is rewritten as follow: 
(4)  M = H1 + H2,  
where H1 = 34PgI >02￿￿<￿￿\￿ - (￿3y/￿\￿￿<￿ 3y￿@￿\ ￿<￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ DQG +2  > .1- ￿.2<￿\ ￿<￿@￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 
The net effects of increasing the market concentration level by one percent on the marketing 
margin are measured by: 
(5)  ￿0￿>￿￿￿￿￿￿\ ￿<￿@  ￿￿3gI >02￿￿<￿￿\￿ - (￿3y/￿\￿￿<￿ 3y￿@ ￿ >￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿@  
                              - ￿.2< ￿ >￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿@￿ 
where, again,  the first and second terms of the right-hand side from the equality represent the 
market power effects and the efficiency effects, respectively, resulting from one percent increase 
in the market concentration level. 
An advanced knowledge of several economic factors is required to differentiate these 
HIIHFWV IRU WKH QLWURJHQ IHUWLOL]HU LQGXVWU\ LQFOXGLQJ 0￿ 2￿ ￿￿ ￿ DQG WKH SURFHVVLQJ FRVW RI QLWURJHQ
fertilizer, c(y, v).  Each of these economic factors will now be explored in turn.    
 
7KH SULFH IOH[LELOLW\ RI QDWXUDO JDV GHPDQG IRU LQGXVWULDO XVH￿ 0  ￿￿3gI /￿*I)(GI /PgI):   
Natural gas utilization for the residential, commercial, industrial, and electric generation 
sectors accounted for 26, 15, 40, and 17 percent, respectively, during the period between 1976 and 
2000.  The remainder is used for transportation.  Natural gas used for nitrogen fertilizer production 
accounts for nearly 8 of the 40 percent of that used by the industrial sector during the same period.  
The natural gas price varies across sectors depending upon the market service requirements of   5 
pipeline companies, storage companies, local distribution companies, and natural gas marketers. 
Usually, residential consumers pay the highest price and the utility sector pays the lowest price.   
  There are 26 major energy companies with domestic U.S. oil and gas operations.  The 
market share by the three largest companies accounted for slightly more than 50 percent of net 
income for this category in 2000 (Energy Information Administration, April 2001).  Therefore, it 
is reasonable to assume that natural gas industry is characterized to have oligopolistic competition. 
To derive an aggregate natural gas demand for each sector, natural gas industry is assumed 
to maximize the following profits 
(6)  π  =∑
m
k
[PgkGk - C(Gk )],  
subject to the following quantity constraint 
(7)   ∑
m
k
Gk ￿( ￿ 
where  
Pgk = the unit price of natural gas for the kth sector,  
E = the aggregate amount of natural gas available in a given year (thousand cubic feet),  
Gk = the amount of natural gas allocated to the kth sector (thousand cubic feet), and  
C(Gk) = the cost function associated with providing natural gas to the kth sector.   
 
The Lagrangian equation is then represented by: 
 
(8) L  =∑
m
k





where λ  is the Lagrangian multiplier.  The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for profit-maximization of the 
natural gas industry under oligopolistic competition are then given by: 
   6 




∂ Gi /∂  Gk]  ≤   0   
      for k = 1, 2, .  .  , m 
(9b)    (∂ L/∂ Gk)Gk  = 0       for k = 1, 2, .  .  .  , m 
(9c) G k  ≥  0                      for k = 1, 2, .  .  .  , m 
(10a)   ∑
m
k
Gk ￿( ￿  
(10b)   λ [E -∑
m
k
Gk] = 0 
(10c)   λ  ≥  0. 
  Inserting equation (9a) into equation (9b) results in the following equation for the kth 
sector: 




&ikGi = 0               for k = 1, 2, .  .  .  , m 
where  
1k   (∂ Pgk/∂ Gk)(Gk /Pgk)] is the price flexibility of natural gas demand in the kth sector,   
!k = (∂ C(Gk)/∂ Gk)(Gk /C(Gk)) is the cost elasticity in the kth sector,  and 
&ik = [(∂ Gi /∂ Gk)(Gk /Gi )]is the elasticity of conjectural variation.  
 
The natural gas price for the kth sector is obtained by rearranging equation (11) as follows: 




&ik (Gi / Gk)] / Zk 
     = α k0 + α kl(G1 /Gk) + α k2(G2 /Gk) +  ⋅  ⋅  ⋅  ⋅  ⋅  ⋅  ⋅  ⋅   + α km(Gm /Gk)    for k = 1, 2, . . . , m 
where  
Zk = (1 + 1k),              7 
C (Gk) = C(Gk)/Gk,   
α k0 = [λ  + !kC (Gk)] / Zk, and  
α ki = λ &ik /Zk  for i ￿ k and i = 1, 2,   .  .  , m. 
 
Since C (Gk) and !k in equation (12) represent average cost and cost elasticity of natural 
gas for the kth sector respectively, therefore, !kC (Gk) represents the marginal cost (price) of 
natural gas for the kth sector.  All parameters in equation (12) for k = 1, 2, . . . , m are estimated 
with the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method. 
 
7UDQVPLVVLRQ HODVWLFLW\ RI QDWXUDO JDV￿ 2  ￿￿*I /￿<￿￿<￿*I):   
Natural gas used for nitrogen fertilizer production accounts for approximately 8 percent of 
aggregate natural gas used for industrial use during the period of 1976 - 2000.  Therefore, the 
transmission elasticity of natural gas, 2￿ is simply assumed to be 0.08 in this study. 
 
3ULFH IOH[LELOLW\ RI QLWURJHQ IHUWLOL]HU GHPDQG￿ ￿  ￿￿3y/￿\￿￿\￿3y):   
The price elasticity estimates of nitrogen fertilizer demand vary widely from very inelastic 
to very elastic depending upon what kinds of crops (and therefore location) for which nutrients are 
applied, whether the production function approach or the cost-function approach is used for 
estimation, and whether the concern is for short-run or long-run analysis (Adelaja and Hoque; 
Binswanger; Gopinath and Wu; Roberts and Heady; Rendleman).  In an aggregate analysis, 
Binswanger noted that nitrogen fertilizer demand is price inelastic in the short-run, but it is elastic 
in the long-run due to technological changes.  
Since the U.S. nitrogen fertilizer industry is characterized under the price leadership model 
for oligopolistic competition (see Appendix), a nitrogen fertilizer inverse demand function defined 
as   8 
(13) P y = f [(Pq / y), (Pg / y)] 
is estimated with the OLS method, where Pq is the price of agricultural outputs and all other 
variables are as defined earlier.   
 
Processing cost, c(y, v):  For the U.S. nitrogen fertilizer industry, the processing cost function of 
the dominant firms, c(y, v), which consists of nitrogen fertilizer production costs other than costs 
to the firm for natural gas, includes costs of electricity and other utilities, operating labor costs, 
maintenance costs, tax and insurance, and depreciation.  Estimation of a nitrogen fertilizer 
processing cost function requires processing cost data at the plants owned by the dominant firms  
which are currently not available to us.  But, annual average production cost data covering the 
period between 1992 and 1999 are available for two plant-size classes from The Fertilizer 
Institute: plants under 1,000 tons of capacity per day and those with a capacity of 1,000 tons and 
over per day.  Therefore, we assumed in our study that the marginal processing costs obtained 
from samples and those from the dominant firms are the same.  The processing cost function to be 
estimated is presented as follow: 
(14)  c(ys,Y￿   .0 ￿ .1ys - .2ys
2 + D1,  
where ys is the average amount of nitrogen fertilizer production from sampled plants and D1 is a 
dummy variable such that D1 = 1 for plants under 1,000 tons of capacity per day and D1 = 0 for 
otherwise.  
The transmission elastLFLW\ RI QLWURJHQ IHUWLOL]HU LQGXVWU\￿ ￿  ￿￿<￿￿\￿￿\￿<￿￿ Under the price 
leadership model for oligopolistic competition the nitrogen fertilizer price is observed along their 
product demand curve AA' in Figure 1 (Appendix), while the nitrogen fertilizer price for all other 
firms is observed along the aggregate marginal cost curve, mc, for these firms (Figure 1).  As the 
dominant firms increase their output by reducing their production costs so that their product price 
falls all other firms reduce their production.  That is, changes in the amounts of nitrogen fertilizer   9 
production by the dominant firms affects the aggregate outputs in the U.S. nitrogen fertilizer 
industry.  Whether aggregate industry output would increase or decrease depends on whether the 
absolute value of the elasticity of the dominant firms' product demand curve is more price elastic 
than that of all other firms' aggregate marginal cost curve.   
Because of limited data on nitrogen fertilizer production costs, the aggregate industry 
nitrogen fertilizer outputs are regressed with the dominant firms' output and time variable as 
follow: 
(15)  log Y   .0 ￿ .1log \￿.2T, 
where T is the time variable. 
 
Data 
Data for the annual nitrogen fertilizer production capacity and ownership of each plant are 
from the Tennessee Valley Authority for the period 1976 to 1995, and from the International 
Fertilizer Development Center for the period 1996 to 2000.  Data for U.S. annual nitrogen 
fertilizer production are obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce.  
Data for the individual firm's nitrogen fertilizer production are not available to us so that the 
nitrogen fertilizer production by the four dominant firms are calculated by multiplying the U.S. 
annual nitrogen fertilizer production by the ratio between the dominant firms' production capacity 
and the annual industry production capacity. 
Data on natural gas prices and natural gas consumption by sector are from the Energy 
Information Administration, Department of Energy.  Production cost data are from the Production 
Cost Survey, The Fertilizer Institute.  All nominal dollars were converted to real 1996 dollars 
using the chained gross domestic product deflator (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000).    
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Estimation Results 
  SUR estimates of natural gas prices for residential, energy industry, commercial, and 
industrial uses are presented in Table 1.  The sign of parameter estimates associated with the 
inverse demands of natural gas for commercial and industrial use are consistent with a priori 
expectation and parameter estimates are statistically significant.  The sign of estimates associated 
with the inverse demand of natural gas for residential and energy industry uses are somewhat 
inconsistent with a priori expectation, which lead to positive price flexibility of natural gas 
demand.  The estimated price flexibility of natural gas demand for industULDO XVH IURP 7DEOH ￿ LV 0
= - 0.8323, which indicates that the natural gas demand for industrial use is elastic (i.e.,  
￿￿0   - 1.2015). 
  Since the nitrogen fertilizer price is determined by dominant firms in price leadership 
model under oligopolistic competition, parameters of the inverse nitrogen fertilizer demand 
function in equation (13) are estimated with the OLS method (Table 2).  The price flexibility of 
QLWURJHQ IHUWLOL]HU GHPDQG PHDVXUHG DW PHDQ YDOXHV LV ￿   -0.8582, indicating that the nitrogen 
IHUWLOL]HU GHPDQG LV SULFH HODVWLF ￿L￿H￿￿ ￿￿ ￿   -1.1652), which is less elastic than -1.3690 estimated 
by Rendleman using a translog cost function approach with aggregate data covering the period 
between 1948 and 1989. 
The cost function estimated with sampled data is presented in Table 2.  Using mean  
values of real total costs and outputs produced by sampled plants, c= $12,021,280 and  s y = 
362,320.2 tons, respectively, the elasticity of total costs is estimated to be 0.78 indicating that the 
nitrogen fertilizer plants reveal economies of size so that larger-sized operations are more cost-
effective.  The estimated transmission function of the nitrogen fertilizer industry is also presented 
in Table 2.  The elasticity of the dominant firms' nitrogen fertilizer production for the aggregate   11 
nitrogen fertilizer production is estimated to be 0.5994, indicating that the dominant firms' product 
demand curve is less price elastic than all other firms' aggregate marginal cost curve.   
Using estimates of 0   -￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2  ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿   -￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3gI = $3.8851 (1996 
dollars) per 1,000 cubic feet, Pn = $305.97 (1996 dollars) per ton, and Y = 17.164 million tons, the 
market power effects and the cost-efficiency effects are estimated as follows:            
 
(16)  Market power effects: ￿+1 / [100*￿￿\ ￿<￿@  ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿LQ ￿￿￿￿ SULFHV￿￿ 
(17) Cost-efficiency  effects:  ￿+2 / [100*￿￿\￿<￿@  ￿-11.14 (in 1996 prices). 
The net effects of increasing the market concentration level by one percent on the marketing 
margin per unit of nitrogen fertilizer, ￿0 / 100*[￿￿\￿<￿@￿ DUH HVWLPDWHG WR EH ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
These results suggest that the market power effects outweigh the cost efficiency effects in 
the U.S. nitrogen fertilizer industry.  The relatively smaller size cost-efficiency effects may result 
from the relative weight of natural gas costs to total production costs for nitrogen fertilizer 
producers, which accounted for 60 percent during the period between 1976 and 2000.  According 
to Phillips and Mathers, the cost of producing a ton of ammonia is about $100 at $2.19 per 
MMBtu with gas being 72 percent of the cost of production.  At $4.50 per MMBtu, the cost rises 
to about $180 per ton of anhydrous ammonia, with gas being 84 percent of the cost of production.  
Since nitrogen fertilizer production costs, other than the costs for natural gas, account for a small 
portion of total production costs, the market power effects in the U.S. nitrogen fertilizer industry 




Empirical results, with data for the period between 1976 and 2000, indicate that for the 
U.S. nitrogen fertilizer industry, market power effects outweigh the cost-efficiency effects by 55 
percent.  This result is expected, because the nitrogen fertilizer production costs other than the   12 
costs for natural gas account for about 30 percent or less of the total production costs for nitrogen 
fertilizer.  These results have implications for U.S. agriculture that the prices farmers pay for 
nitrogen fertilizer are significantly higher than what farmers would have to pay if the nitrogen 
fertilizer industry operated under perfectly competitive market conditions, thereby reducing net 
farm income.  On the other hand, if fertilizer prices were lower, application rates would be higher 
with accompanying higher crop production and higher potential for more nitrites in ground water. 
The market power effects associated with the dominant firms evaluated in this study are a 
measure of economic rents agriculture is obligated to pay, that is, in higher nitrogen fertilizer 
prices, thereby reducing net farm income from levels that may exist otherwise if there were 
perfectly competitive market conditions in the U.S. nitrogen fertilizer industry.  In addition, the 
strong market power effects in the U.S. nitrogen fertilizer industry has implications for the 
stability of both nitrogen fertilizer supply and prices to farmers.  If the dominant firms do not raise 
the nitrogen fertilizer price enough in response to rising natural gas price, the dominant firms' 
profits would decline, which would lead to reduced production of nitrogen fertilizers, and thereby 
also create the potential for greater instability in market supplies of nitrogen fertilizer.  Farmers 
ultimately pay the economic rents associated with pricing under oligopoly within the U.S. nitrogen 
fertilizer industry, or switch to produce alternative crops such as soybeans.  
Long-term contracts by nitrogen fertilizer producers do not necessarily lead to stable 
nitrogen fertilizer supply at a relatively low price.  As natural gas price rises, nitrogen fertilizer 
producers may be better off by selling their contracted natural gas rather than producing nitrogen 
fertilizers.  With the current level of market concentration in the U.S. nitrogen fertilizer industry, 
policy options to prevent the resulting potential instability in nitrogen fertilizer supply and the 
burden of agricultural economic rents could include subsidizing nitrogen fertilizer producers,   13 
removing new import restrictions imposed on natural gas rich countries in the Middle East and 
former member states of the Soviet Union, or imposing natural gas price controls.  
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Table 1.  Seemingly Unrelated Regression estimates of natural gas prices for residential, energy  
industry, commercial, and industrial uses during the periods of 1976-1999. 
 
Variables
1    log  PR   log  PC   log  PI   log  PE 
 
constant     2.0058   1.7785   1.2265   0.9702 
                   (0.2102)
2              (0.2460)               (0.4378)                (0.5954)                           
 
log(C/R)                 - 0.6639      
                  (0.3160)  
     
log(I/R)                - 0.4839 
                  (0.1718)     
 
log(E/R)                  0.3439 
                  (0.1229) 
  
log(R/C)                                             1.0302 
                     (0.3106) 
 
log(I/C)                   - 0.5689    
                     (0.1888) 
 
log(E/C)                     0.3879 
                     (0.1338)   
 
log( R/I)                         1.6526 
                         (0.5053) 
                    
log(C/I)                        -1.2458 
                         (0.6142) 
 
log(E/I)                         0.4255* 
                         (0.2187)   
 
log(R/E)           1.8583 
                                 (0.6630)                              
  
log(C/E)                             - 1.5011     
                               (0.8153)              
   
log(I/E)                                          - 0.8949 




2     0.87   0.87   0.84   0.81
    
             
Durbin-Watson      1.47   1.46   1.29   1.41 
Statistics 
 
1  The subscript R, C, I, and E represent residential, commercial, industrial use, and energy industry, respectively. 
2   Number in the parenthesis is standard error.
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Table 2.  Parameter estimation results. 
 
Nitrogen fertilizer demand: 
Py = 29,238.02 (Pq /Y) + 509,082.7 (PgI /Y)      where   y = 0.4267Y   
      (13,116.64)
1              (298,918.7) 
 
 R
2 = 0.74               D.W. = 2.16 
 
Processing cost function: 
 
c(ys,v) = -10,041,850 + 95.3755 ys - 9.57E-05 ys
2 + 4,393,833 D1, where y s = 0.04927 y  
              (11,124,814)  (39.3192)     (4.36E-05)       (5,446,767)  
 
 R
2 = 0.89               D.W. = 2.00 
 
Nitrogen fertilizer industry transmission function:     
 
log(Y) = 4.5598 + 0.6389 log y - 0.1858 log (T)      
             (0.8220)   (0.0986)         (0.0376) 
 
 R
2 = 0.90               D.W. = 1.73 
 
1  Number in the parenthesis is standard error.  16 
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Appendix 
To demonstrate whether the U.S. nitrogen fertilizer industry is characterized under the 
price leadership model for oligopolistic competition, the first step is to derive the plant-number 
function and this number function is then used to test for the price leadership in the U.S. nitrogen 
fertilizer industry ( Kim, Hallahan, and Taylor).  To derive the plant-number function, assume that 
the cost of producing output yi+1 equals the cost of producing yi in Ni separate but identical plant 
operations such that: 
(A1)      ci+1 (yi+1(x1, x2, .., xn)) = Ni(yi(x1, x2, .., xn))ci(yi(x1, x2, .., xn))           for i = 1, 2, . . . , m-1,  
where  ci+1 (yi+1) is the cost function associated with the output level yi+1,  
Ni   is the number of plants in the ith size class, 
xk is the kth input, and  
ci(yi) is a cost function associated with the output level yi.   
Differentiating both sides of equation (A1) with respect to input price pk associated with xk and 
applying Shephard's lemma results in the following: 
(A2)       [￿OQ Ni(yi) / ￿OQ pk] = [pkxk(yi+1) / ci+1(yi+1)] – [pkxk(yi) / ci(yi)]  for i = 1, 2, . . . , m-1. 
The left-hand side from the equality in equation (A2) represents the kth input price elasticity for 
the number of the ith size plant.  First and second terms of the right-hand side from the equality 
represent the kth input cost shares of the (i+1)th size plant and the ith size plant, respectively.  
Equation (A2) indicates that the input price elasticity for the number of plant in each size class can 
be used to determine whether structural changes in the U.S. nitrogen fertilizer industry are the kth 
factor saving or the kth factor using technical changes.  If the right-hand side is positive (negative), 
the ith size plant is considered to have kth-input saving (using) technical change. 













[∂ ln(yi+1)/￿OQ pk]   
for i = 1, 2, . . . , m-1, 
where η (yi) is the elasticity of total costs associated with the production of yi from the ith size 
plant.  In the case where the input price elasticities of output are the same across the size of plants, 
equation (A3) can be rewritten as: 








[∂ ln (yi) / ￿OQ pk] 





[￿OQ Ni(yi) / ￿OQ pk] = η (yi) - η (yi+1)                  for i = 1, 2, . . . , m-1. 
In a conventional point estimate of economies of size obtained from a cost function, the plant 
reveals economies of size if η (yi) < 1, so that larger-sized operations are more cost-effective, and 
diseconomies of size if η (yi) > 1, so that many smaller-size plant operations are more cost 





[￿OQ Ni(yi) / ￿OQ pk] < 0 and larger-size plant operation is more cost effective. 
The functional form of Ni(yi) function derived from equation (A2) is presented by: 
(A6)  Ni(yi) = exp{￿ [η (yi+1)(∂ ln(yi+1)/￿pk)  - η (yi)(∂ ln(yi+1)/￿ pk￿@ /pk}, 
which has an exponential form.  Therefore, a decomposed Poisson regression model for the U.S. 
nitrogen fertilizer industry is represented by: 
(A7)   E[Nlh,t | (w/Py)t, (r/Py)t, (Pg/Py)t] 
= exp{∑∑
== 11 lh




￿l,hDl,h(Pg/Py )t  
           +∑∑
== 21 lh
/l,hDl,h ￿ ￿ M}  
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where,  Nl,h = the number of fertilizer plants which are in plant size category and firm ownership 
category  h,  
w = the hourly wage of production workers in the fertilizer industry, 
r = corporate bond rate, 
Py = unit price of nitrogen fertilizer, 
Pg = unit price of natural gas, 
Dl,h = a dummy variable associated with the lth plant size-class of the hth firm ownership, and 
M = a dummy variable equal to 1 for the dominant firms, and equal to zero for all other firms. 
 
  Profits to be maximized for the dominant firms can be presented by: 
(A8)  ￿ = ∑
i
( PyNiyi - Nici) 
where the subscript i represents the ith plant size class and ci is unit cost of producing yi.  
Differentiating equation (A8) with respect to a unit price of the jth input results in the following: 
(A9)  ￿￿ /￿Pj  ￿ ￿ 0   iff   ￿Ni /￿Pj ￿ Ni [xj - Py(￿yi /￿Pj)] /(yiPy - ci). 
Summing equation (A9) over plant size classes and inputs results in the following: 
(A10)  ∑
= 1 j
[￿￿ /￿Pj] ￿ ￿ 0   iff  ∑∑
== 11 ij
[￿Ni /￿Pj] ￿ ∑∑
== 11 ij
Ni [xj - Py(￿yi /￿Pj)] /(yiPy - ci). 
Since both [xj - Py(￿yi /￿Pj)] and (yiPy - ci) in equation (A10) are positive,  the positive input price 
elasticity for the number of plants owned by the dominant firms would result in positive profits.  
From the plant-number function in (A7), the output price elasticity for the number of plants equals 
the negative sum of input price elasticities for the number of plants.   
From Figure 1, the curves AA' and AR are the nitrogen fertilizer demand curve and the 
marginal revenue curve, respectively, for the dominant firms, and Mc and mc are the marginal cost 
curves of the dominant firms and all other minor firms, respectively.  The curve DHA' represents   21 
the industry market demand curve.  Under the price leadership model in oligopolistic competition, 
the dominant firms set their output price along their demand curve, AA', and all other firms sell all 
they can at that price along their marginal cost curve (or the supply curve of minor firms), mc.  
Therefore, if the U.S. nitrogen fertilizer industry is characterized by price leadership in oligopoly, 
then the output price elasticity for the number plants would be negative for the dominant firms and 
positive for all other minor firms.  22 
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             Figure 1.  The dominant firm model. 